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Introduction
On March 23, 2003 coalition forces invaded Iraq after it was found to be inmaterial breach of its obligations under numerous UN Security Council
resolutions. Less than two months later, on May 1, 2003, President Bush made his
historic “mission accomplished” speech from the flight deck of the USS Abraham
Lincoln, declaring that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended [and that] in
the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”1 Six years later,
US combat troops remain in Iraq fighting a violent insurgency. Although the situa-
tion has improved over the past year, President Obama has vowed to end US com-
bat operations no later than August 31, 2010.2 Even if the President does not live up
to his campaign promise, all US forces must withdraw from Iraq no later than
December 31, 2011, unless otherwise authorized by the Iraqi government.3 This
article will briefly discuss the legal bases for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the
legal bases for follow-on operations after May 1, 2003 and the characterization of
the conflict across the spectrum of operations.
Legal Bases for Launch of Operations
Justifications for Going to War
On March 23, 2003 US, British and other coalition forces invaded Iraq. The mili-
tary intervention was justified primarily along two lines: repeated Iraqi violations
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of a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions and the right of self-
defense, and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian intervention.4 While I tend to agree
with the UK Attorney General that the right of self-defense and the principle of hu-
manitarian intervention did not provide a sound legal basis for the invasion,5 I do
believe there was sufficient justification to attack Iraq based on its continuous and
flagrant disregard of its disarmament and other obligations under numerous Secu-
rity Council resolutions. It is true that weapons inspectors failed to find large quan-
tities of chemical and biological weapons following the invasion and that evidence
relied on by the United States and the United Kingdom to justify the invasion—
e.g., Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda, Iraq’s pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weap-
ons programs, etc.—was subsequently shown to be based on fraudulent docu-
ments or unsubstantiated assertions of Iraqi defectors.6 However, the fact remains
that, at the time of the invasion, Iraq was in breach of all fourteen of its weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) obligations set out in numerous Security Council reso-
lutions, as well as its obligations under Resolution 687 (1991)7 to renounce terror-
ism; under Resolution 688 (1991)8 to cease internal oppression of its civilian
population; under Resolutions 686 (1991),9 687 and 1284 (1999)10 to account for
Kuwaiti and third-country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq; and Resolutions
686 and 687 to return all Kuwaiti property it had seized.11
Iraq’s Violations of Its Obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions
No one disagrees with the fact that Iraq flagrantly and repeatedly violated countless
Security Council resolutions,12 as well as its obligations under various interna-
tional instruments,13 and that it failed to cooperate with United Nations and Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors for more than two
decades. Four months after agreeing to the ceasefire terms in Resolution 687 that
ended the first Gulf War, Iraq commenced its pattern of noncompliance with the
ceasefire agreement and failure to fully cooperate with UN and IAEA weapons in-
spectors.14 This pattern continued throughout the remainder of the decade,15 cul-
minating in US and UK airstrikes against military targets in Iraq in December 1998
after the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) submitted a report to the Security
Council indicating that Iraq had failed to cooperate fully with its inspectors.16 Iraqi
officials did not allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq until 2002.17
Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)
In September 2002, Iraqi officials met with UN Monitoring, Verification and In-
spection Commission (UNMOVIC)18 and IAEA officials to discuss the resump-
tion of weapons inspections in Iraq. During that meeting, Iraqi officials agreed to
accept “all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council
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resolutions . . . [and that this] acceptance was stated to be without any conditions
attached.”19 Specifically, Iraq agreed that UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be
“granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites” in Iraq.20 On
October 8, 2002, UNMOVIC and the IAEA sent a letter to the government of Iraq
requesting that it confirm the terms of the inspection arrangements agreed to in
September. Concerned by the continued failure by Iraq to provide the requested
confirmation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on November 2, 2002
in order to afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obliga-
tions under relevant resolutions of the Council.”21 Two months later, in its Twelfth
Quarterly Report to the Security Council, UNMOVIC reported that Iraq had yet to
comply as required with its disarmament obligations.22
The Need for Further Security Council Action?
In Resolution 1441 the Security Council decided, inter alia,
• That Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations under relevant
resolutions,” including Resolution 687 (operative paragraph 1);
• To afford Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations” under previous resolutions and establish an enhanced inspection
regime (operative paragraph 2);
• That “false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq
pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and
cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute a further
material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for
assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12” (operative paragraph 4);
• That “UNMOVIC and . . . IAEA . . . report immediately to the Council any
interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to
comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding
inspections under this resolution” (operative paragraph 11);
• To “convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with
paragraph 4 or 11 . . ., in order to consider the situation and the need for full
compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure
international peace and security” (operative paragraph 12).
It is clear from the foregoing that even though Iraq was found to be in “material
breach” of its obligations under Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions,
the Security Council did not intend that the use of force authorization in Resolu-
tion 678 should revive immediately, since Resolution 1441 afforded Iraq a “final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”23 What is less clear is
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whether paragraph 12 of 1441 required the Council to adopt a second resolution
before States could use force against Iraq. The US24 and UK25 ambassadors clearly
believed that a second resolution was not necessary. France, Russia, China, Ireland,
Mexico, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cameroon and Syria indicated that the use of force
had to be authorized by the Security Council.26 A close analysis of the language in
the resolution, as well as that of previous resolutions, supports the US and British
position.
Resolution 687 “suspended, but did not terminate,” the authority to use force in
Resolution 678.27 Moreover, the ceasefire was conditioned on Iraqi compliance
with the obligations imposed by 687 and subsequent relevant resolutions.28 In this
regard, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1441 that Iraq “has been and re-
mains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions,” including
687, and indicated that Iraq had “been warned repeatedly that ‘serious conse-
quences’” would result from continued violations of its obligations.29 Resolution
1441 also makes clear that compliance with its terms was Iraq’s last chance before
the ceasefire resolution would be enforced should Iraq fail to comply with the en-
hanced inspection regime established by paragraphs 3 and 4.30
Pursuant to paragraph 11 of 1441, UNMOVIC reported to the Security Council
in its Twelfth Quarterly Report in January 2003 that Iraq was not in compliance
with the disarmament obligations established in paragraphs 3 and 4 and other rele-
vant resolutions.31 The Council then convened “in order to consider the situation
and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in or-
der to secure international peace and security.”32 But does paragraph 12 require a
further Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force? I would suggest
that the answer to that question is “no.”
Resolution 1441 does not indicate that the Security Council must “decide” what
action to take based on a report from UNMOVIC that Iraq is not in compliance
with its disarmament obligations. It simply requires that the Council “consider the
situation.” There is a clear distinction between the meaning of “consider” and
“decide” in resolutions.33 Note, for example, the language used in paragraph 33 of
Resolution 1874 (2009), condemning North Korea’s nuclear test of May 25, 2009,
in which the Council specifically states “that further decisions will be required,
should additional measures be necessary.”34 Moreover, during the drafting of 1441
France and Russia proposed language that would have required the Security Coun-
cil to “decide” that subsequent Iraqi conduct amounted to a “material breach”;
however, the proposal was rejected by the US and UK representatives precisely to
avoid the need for a second resolution.35 The US delegation clearly indicated
throughout the debate “that they would not accept a text which subjected the use of
force to a further Council decision,” arguing that the determination of “material
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breach” in paragraphs 1 and 4 of 1441 remained valid regardless of further Security
Council action.36 Therefore, the French and other members of the Council knew
what they were voting for when they chose to use the word “consider” rather than
“decide” in paragraph 12. Additionally, the Security Council determination in Res-
olution 1137 (1997) that the situation in Iraq “continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security” remained in effect.37 Under these circumstances,
Iraq’s failure to comply with the enhanced inspection regime established in 1441,
as reported by UNMOVIC, revived the use of force authorization contained in
Resolution 678.38
Operation Desert Fox (1998)
It is also important to note that the United States and United Kingdom had taken a
similar position in 1998, when US and British forces conducted a series of airstrikes
against Iraqi military targets after an UNSCOM report clearly indicated that Iraq
had failed to keep its promises to cooperate fully with UNSCOM.39 They justified
their action on Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully with UNSCOM, arguing that Reso-
lution 687 (or any subsequent resolution) did not terminate the authority to use
force in Resolution 678, but, rather, only suspended that authority.40 It was further
argued that a serious violation of Iraq’s obligations under 687 that undermined the
basis of the ceasefire would revive the use of force authorization in 678.41 Portugal42
and Japan43 supported the US and UK position. Russia, China, France, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Kenya and Sweden disagreed, however, indicating that Security Council
action was necessary before military strikes could be conducted to enforce Resolu-
tion 687.44 Slovenia, Gambia and Gabon voiced neither opposition to nor support
for the operation.45 Under these circumstances, it should have come as no surprise
that the United States and United Kingdom would take military action independ-
ent of further Security Council action if Iraq did not comply with the terms of Res-
olution 1441.
Effect of Ceasefire Violations?
One additional point regarding whether a second resolution was required to au-
thorize the use of force against Iraq to implement Resolution 1441 also merits dis-
cussion. The ceasefire agreement established in Resolution 687 was between the
coalition forces and Iraq, not the United Nations and Iraq. In accordance with the
agreement and long-standing principles of international law reflected in the 1907
Hague Regulations,46 the coalition agreed to suspend offensive military operations
against Iraq in exchange for Iraq’s full compliance with the terms of the ceasefire
and its disarmament obligations under previous Security Council resolutions.
Once Iraq was found to be in material breach of the conditions of the ceasefire,
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beginning with Resolution 707 in 1991 and culminating with Resolution 1441 in
2002, the coalition partners were free to nullify the ceasefire and rely on the use of
force authorization in Resolution 678 to resume hostilities against Iraq to enforce
Resolution 687 and restore international peace and security to the area.47
Legal Bases for Follow-On Operations
Occupation and the Coalition Provisional Authority
President Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003.48 One
week later, while avoiding the use of the term “occupying power,” the member
States of the coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on May 8,
2003 “to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, . . . to pro-
vide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction.”49 Specifically, the coalition partners, working through the
CPA, were to provide for security in Iraq, eliminate Iraq’s WMD program, facili-
tate the return of refugees and displaced persons, maintain civil law and order,
eliminate all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and work to ensure
terrorists were denied safe haven, coordinate demining operations, promote ac-
countability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous regime and as-
sume control of the institutions responsible for military and security matters.50
The statuses of CPA, Multi-National Forces (MNF), foreign liaison missions, dip-
lomatic and consular missions and contractor personnel were governed by CPA
Order No. 17 (Revised).51 Specifically, section 2 of the Order provided that the
MNF, CPA and foreign liaison mission personnel, as well as international consul-
tants, were “immune from Iraqi legal process” and were “subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their Sending State.” Similarly, section 3 granted contractors immu-
nity, albeit more limited, for acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions
of their contracts. Additionally, section 14 authorized the MNF and private secu-
rity company personnel to “possess and carry arms while on official duty in accor-
dance with their orders or under the terms and conditions of their contracts.”
Similarly, diplomatic and consular personnel could carry arms while on official
duty if authorized by the ambassador or chargé d’affaires of a sending State.
Consistent with the 1907 Hague Regulations,52 1949 Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons53 and 1977 Geneva Protocol I,54 CPA Reg-
ulation No. 1 provided that the CPA would “exercise powers of government
temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq . . ., to re-
store conditions of security and stability, [and] to create conditions in which the
Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future . . . .” Regulation 1 also
vested the CPA “with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to
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achieve its objectives” and provided that Commander, US Central Command, as
the commander of coalition forces, would “directly support the CPA by deterring
hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; . . . destroying
weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy . . . .”55
Security Council Resolution 1483 recognized the “special authorities, responsi-
bilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states [the
United States and United Kingdom] as occupying powers” and called on the CPA
“to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of
the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions
of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people
can freely determine their own political future.”56 Resolution 1483 also supported
“the formation . . . of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administra-
tion run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government
is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the
Authority.”
On July 13, 2003, consistent with Resolution 1483, the CPA “recognized the
formation of the Governing Council as the principal body of the Iraqi interim ad-
ministration, pending the establishment of an internationally recognized, repre-
sentative government by the people of Iraq.”57 Section 2 of CPA Regulation No. 6
provided that “the Governing Council and the CPA shall consult and coordinate
on all matters involving the temporary governance of Iraq . . . .” The Security
Council welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council on August 14,
2003.58 On June 1, 2004, the Governing Council was dissolved following the estab-
lishment of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq.59 The CPA officially ceased to
exist, and the occupation phase ended on June 30, 2004 when the Interim Govern-
ment of Iraq assumed full responsibility and authority for governing Iraq until an
elected transitional government of Iraq could assume office.60
United Nations Mandate
In view of the increasingly unstable security conditions in Iraq, the Security Coun-
cil authorized a multinational force “to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” and urged “Member States to
contribute . . . military forces to the multinational force . . . .”61 This mandate was
reaffirmed by the Security Council on June 8, 2004 at the request of the Interim
Government of Iraq.62 However, the Iraqi request did impose some conditions on
the MNF, to include
• The MNF and Iraqi security forces (ISF) would coordinate “on all security
policy and operations issues in order to achieve unity of command of military
operations” in which the ISF were engaged with the MNF.
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• The MNF and Iraqi government leaders would “keep each other informed
of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of
personnel, resources and facilities, [would] share intelligence, and [would] refer
issues up the respective chains of command where necessary.”
• The ISF would progressively assume greater responsibility.
• The MNF would work with the Ministerial Committee for National Security
to “reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues,
including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and . . . ensure full partnership
between MNF and Iraqi forces, through close coordination and consultation.”63
Operative paragraph 13 of Resolution 1546 also established a new mission for
the MNF, the establishment of a separate organization under unified command of
the MNF with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United Nations As-
sistance Mission for Iraq, and paragraph 14 recognized that the MNF would also
assist in building the capacity of the ISF and institutions through a program of “re-
cruitment, training, equipping, mentoring and monitoring.”
The Transitional National Assembly was elected on January 30, 2005 and the
draft constitution was approved by the Iraqi people on October 15, 2005.64 Not-
withstanding these positive political developments, the Iraqi government recog-
nized that the ISF was not prepared to assume full responsibility for the security of
Iraq and requested that the UN extend the MNF mandate for another year in ac-
cordance with the tasks and arrangements outlined in Resolution 1546 (2004).65
Accordingly, on November 8, 2005, the Security Council extended the mandate
(including participation in the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction as-
sistance) of the MNF until December 31, 2006.66
The following month elections for a new Iraqi National Assembly were held
under the 2005 constitution and a new national unity government was formed in
May 2006.67 Again, despite progress on the political front and the turnover of secu-
rity responsibilities to the ISF in Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces, the Iraqi gov-
ernment renewed its request for military assistance on June 9, 200668 and
November 11, 2006,69 and the Security Council extended the MNF’s mandate for
another year.70
UNMOVIC and IAEA mandates were terminated in June 2007 following a Se-
curity Council determination that Iraq was in compliance with its disarmament
obligations under relevant resolutions.71 Five months later, on November 26, 2007,
the United States and Iraq issued a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Rela-
tionship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the
United States of America.72 The United States agreed to provide “security assur-
ances and commitments to . . . Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq” and
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support Iraq “in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups.”73 Iraq agreed to request
an extension of the MNF mandate “for a final time”74 and on December 7, 2007
submitted a letter to the Security Council requesting an extension of the mandate
“one last time,” subject to the following conditions:
• “The functions of recruiting, training, arming and equipping of the Iraqi
Army and . . . [ISF] are the responsibility of the Government of Iraq.”
• “The Government of Iraq will assume responsibility for command and
control of all Iraqi forces, and MNF, in coordination with the Government of Iraq,
will provide support and backing to those forces.”
• “The Government of Iraq will be responsible for arrest, detention and
imprisonment tasks. When those tasks are carried out by MNF-I, there will be
maximum levels of coordination, cooperation and understanding with the
Government of Iraq.”
• “The Government of Iraq considers this to be its final request” for the
extension of the MNF mandate.75
Following the signing of the Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq
(hereinafter US-Iraq security agreement),76 the Prime Minister of Iraq informed
the Security Council on December 7, 2008 that the MNF mandate would terminate
on December 31, 2008.77
US-Iraq Security Agreement
The US military presence and activities in Iraq are currently authorized by the US-
Iraq security agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. Pursuant to
Article 24, all US forces shall be withdrawn from Iraq no later than December 31,
2011. Article 24 also provides that all US combat forces were to be withdrawn from
Iraqi cities and villages when the ISF assumed full responsibility for security in an
Iraqi province or by June 30, 2009, whichever occurred first, and would be sta-
tioned in agreed facilities and areas designated by the Joint Military Operations
Coordination Committee (JMOCC). In addition, the government of Iraq will as-
sume full responsibility for the Green Zone, although it may request “limited and
temporary support” from the US forces to secure the zone.78
While US forces may continue to engage in offensive military operations within
Iraq, their freedom to do so is limited by the security agreement. Article 4 autho-
rizes US forces to support Iraq “in its efforts to maintain security and stability in
Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.” Arti-
cle 4 further specifies that all “military operations that are carried out pursuant to
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this Agreement shall be conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq”
and “shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities.” Any disagreement regard-
ing a proposed military operation that cannot be resolved by the JMOCC shall be
forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee for resolution.79 US forces are also
prohibited from conducting a detention or arrest unless authorized or requested
by Iraqi officials, provided that any person detained or arrested by US forces must
be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within twenty-four hours of the ar-
rest or detention.80 Additionally, Article 22 prohibits US forces from searching a
house or other property “except by order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full co-
ordination with the Government of Iraq,” except in the case of combat operations
authorized by Article 4 of the security agreement.
Notwithstanding these provisions, US forces retain the right of self-defense81
and are authorized to carry weapons owned by the United States “according to the
authority granted to them under orders and according to their requirements and
duties.”82 The United States retains the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over US forces, including the civilian component, for “matters arising inside
agreed facilities and areas; during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas.”
Iraq has primary jurisdiction over “grave premeditated felonies . . . when such
crimes are committed outside agreed facilities and areas outside duty status.”83
With that exception, the United States has primary jurisdiction over members of
the force even for crimes committed outside agreed facilities and areas and even if
the member is not in a duty status. Iraq does have the primary right to exercise ju-
risdiction over US contractors and their employees.84
In addition to authorizing US military operations in Iraq, the US-Iraq security
agreement provides for more traditional security assistance activities. In this re-
gard, Article 4 provides that US forces shall continue to “cooperate to strengthen
Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equip-
ping, supporting, supplying, and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, in-
cluding transportation, housing and supplies” for the ISF. Similarly, Article 27
provides that the parties “agree to continue close cooperation in strengthening and
maintaining military and security institutions . . . in Iraq, including, as may be mu-
tually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming . . .” the ISF upon the
request by the Iraqi government. Article 27 also provides that, in the event of an ex-
ternal or internal threat or aggression against Iraq and upon the request of the Iraqi
government, the “Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and, as
may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, includ-
ing diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter
such a threat.”
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It has been argued by some that the US-Iraq security agreement is invalid be-
cause the domestic legal authority to engage in military operations in Iraq expired
on December 31, 2008.85 Section 3 of Congress’s 2002 Joint Resolution to Autho-
rize the Use of Military Force Against Iraq86 authorizes the President to use the US
armed forces to (1) defend US national security against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and (2) enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq. However, in November 2008 the United States agreed that Iraq’s designation
as a threat to international peace and security would end on December 31, 2008,87
contemporaneously with the expiration of the MNF mandate. Consequently, the
authority to use force under the 2002 Joint Resolution has expired. Of course, this
argument has merit only if you subscribe to the position that the President does not
have the constitutional authority to deploy US forces abroad without the concur-
rence of Congress.
It should also be noted that a bill was introduced in the US House of Representa-
tives on January 8, 2009 that would invalidate the US-Iraq security agreement.88
H.R. 335, which is currently in committee, provides in section 3 that any agree-
ment that sets out broad parameters for the overall bilateral relationship between
the United States and Iraq should “involve a joint decision by the executive and
legislative branches.” Section 6 goes on to prohibit the entry into force of any
agreement between the United States and Iraq that contains a security commit-
ment or security arrangement, as well as the obligation or expenditure of funds to
implement such an agreement, unless the agreement has been authorized by a sub-
sequent law or has the advice and consent of the Senate. The proposed legislation is
based on a faulty premise that the President cannot enter into a bilateral agreement
without the advice and consent of the Senate. Clearly, executive agreements have
the same legal effect under US law as a treaty that has received Senate advice and
consent.89 However, should such a law be enacted in conjunction with legislation
that restricts the expenditure of Department of Defense appropriations to fund
military activities under the security agreement, the status of US personnel in Iraq
would be in question.
Characterization of the Conflict
Without question, the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in March 2003 was an in-
ternational armed conflict, which quickly transitioned into a period of belligerent
occupation in May 2003.90 With the disestablishment of the CPA in June 2004, the
occupation period ended; however, a violent insurgency quickly evolved. As a result,
coalition forces remained in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government to help
suppress the insurgency and restore international peace and security.91 During this
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period was the coalition engaged in a non-international armed conflict or an inter-
national armed conflict? There was significant international involvement in the in-
surgency, but coalition forces were not fighting against the government of Iraq.
From a US perspective, does it really matter? US policy applies the laws of war to all
armed conflicts, regardless of how they are characterized, and to all other military
operations.92 From a practicable point of view, the real question is: does human
rights law applicable during a non-international armed conflict provide greater
protection to combatants and noncombatants than is afforded to these individuals
under international humanitarian law applicable during an international armed
conflict? I would suggest that the answer to that question is “no.” The protections
afforded to combatants and noncombatants under both bodies of law are qualita-
tively and quantitatively alike.
Conclusion
The invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 clearly constituted a short-lived interna-
tional armed conflict between the States of the Multi-National Forces and Iraq.
Whether the United States can justify the military intervention on the grounds of
self-defense and/or humanitarian intervention is questionable; however, there is
no doubt that Iraq failed to fully cooperate with the United Nations and Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, and was in material breach of its obligations under
at least twenty-five Security Council resolutions covering two decades. Although
Resolution 1441 could have been clearer, it did not specifically indicate that a fur-
ther decision would be required should additional measures be necessary if Iraq
failed to comply with its terms. In fact, efforts by France and Russia to include such
a requirement failed in the Security Council. Additionally, traditional armistice
law would support the resumption of hostilities by coalition forces. Under these
circumstances, Iraq’s violation of its obligations under Resolution 1441 and the
Resolution 687 ceasefire agreement revived the use of force authorization con-
tained in Resolution 678 and provided a sufficient legal basis for coalition forces to
conduct offensive military operations against Iraq.
The international armed conflict quickly transformed into a period of belligerent
occupation that began on May 8, 2003 with the establishment of the CPA. Although
the occupation phase ended on June 30, 2004 when the CPA was disestablished and
the Interim Government of Iraq assumed full authority for governing Iraq, coali-
tion forces and the ISF remained engaged in an armed conflict with the insurgents.
Whether that conflict should be characterized as non-international or interna-
tional is a matter of academic debate, but has little practical effect on the way US
forces conduct themselves on the battlefield.
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The continued presence of the MNF during this phase of the conflict was at the
request of the government of Iraq and was authorized by Security Council Resolu-
tions 1511, 1546, 1637, 1723 and 1790. Each of these resolutions incrementally re-
duced the authority of the MNF to engage in offensive military operations without
coordination with the government of Iraq. With the expiration of the UN mandate
on December 31, 2008 and the entry into force of the US-Iraq security agreement
on January 1, 2009, US military activities have been further limited. It will be inter-
esting to see if the security agreement stands the test of time and survives US con-
gressional scrutiny, and whether the President vetoes any legislation that would
purport to invalidate it.
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.com/news/2009/feb/28/obama-outlines-withdrawal-from-iraq/.
3. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the With-
drawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq art. 24(1), Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/world/20081119_SOFA_FINAL_AGREED_TEXT.pdf [hereinafter US-Iraq Secu-
rity Agreement].
4. The legal justification for the invasion is discussed in recently released documents from
the US Department of Justice, including two opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel. See Jay S.
Bybee, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, Authority of the President Un-
der Domestic and International Law to Use Military Force Against Iraq (Oct. 23, 2002), http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/2002/iraq-opinion-final.pdf [hereinafter Authority of the President]; John
C. Yoo, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, Effect of a Recent United Nations
Security Council Resolution on the Authority of the President Under International Law to Use
Military Force Against Iraq (Nov. 8, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2002/iraq-unscr-final.pdf.
See also Letter dated March 20, 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the President of the United Nations Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/2003/351 (2003).
Reasons enumerated by Congress in the legislation that authorized the use of force against
Iraq can be found in Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002), reprinted in 41 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1440 (2002) [hereinafter Authorization for Use of Military Force], and include
• Iraq posed a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and
international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region.
• Iraq remained in material breach and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations by continuing to possess and develop a WMD capability, actively
seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist
organizations.
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• Iraq persisted in violating Security Council resolutions by continuing to
engage in brutal repression of its civilian population; by refusing to release,
repatriate or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq; and by
failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait.
• The Iraqi regime had demonstrated its capability and willingness to use WMD
against other nations and its own people.
• The Iraqi regime had demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and
willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to
assassinate former President Bush and by firing on thousands of occasions on US
and coalition forces engaged in enforcing Security Council resolutions.
• Members of al-Qaeda were known to be in Iraq.
• Iraq continued to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations,
including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of US citizens.
• The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States underscored the gravity of
the threat posed by the acquisition of WMD by international terrorist
organizations.
• Iraq had demonstrated the capability and willingness to use WMD and there
was a risk Iraq would either employ those weapons against the United States or its
armed forces, or provide them to international terrorists who would do so.
• Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of all necessary means to
enforce Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq
to cease certain activities that threatened international peace and security,
including the development of WMD, refusal or obstruction of UN weapons
inspections in violation of Resolution 687, repression of its civilian population in
violation of Resolution 688, and threatening its neighbors or UN operations in
Iraq in violation of Resolution 949.
Reasons articulated by the UK government can be found at Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Iraq, http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/
Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1068716801627 (last visited
Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Iraq Military Action]. These include
• During the four months following the adoption of Resolution 1441, Iraq
“failed to answer a single outstanding question about its WMD programmes, or
resolve any outstanding issues as requested by the UN.”
• Iraq failed to account for thousands of tons of chemical and biological weapons
materials left unaccounted for when UN weapons inspectors were forced to leave
in 1998.
• Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with the UN left the United Kingdom no option but
“to take military action to enforce Iraq’s disarmament obligations” pursuant to
the relevant Security Council resolutions.
• “Authority to use force against Iraq derived from the combined effect of”
Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 without the need for another resolution.
5. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister (Mar. 7, 2003), http://collections
.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7445.asp.
6. See, e.g., Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Pro-
grams and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, S. Rep. No.
109-331 (2006); INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT, SADDAM
AND TERRORISM: EMERGING INSIGHTS FROM CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/index.html; CHARLES DUELFER, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
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OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ’S WMD
(2004), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/
index.html.
7. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
8. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
9. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991).
10. S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).
11. See, e.g., Iraq Military Action, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 1284, supra note 10, paras. 7 & 8;
S.C. Res. 1441, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
12. Iraqi violations included:
• Security Council Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990) demands Iraq’s withdrawal
from Kuwait.
• Security Council Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990) imposes economic sanctions
on Iraq for its failure to comply with Resolution 660.
• Security Council Resolution 662 (Aug. 9, 1990) demands once again that Iraq
withdraw from Kuwait.
• Security Council Resolution 664 (Aug. 18, 1990) demands Iraq take no action
to harm third-State nationals in Kuwait.
• Security Council Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990) imposes a maritime blockade
of Iraq for its failure to comply with Resolutions 660, 661, 662 and 664.
• Security Council Resolution 666 (Sept. 13, 1990) reaffirms Iraq’s obligations
under Resolution 664 with regard to third-State nationals.
• Security Council Resolution 667 (Sept. 16, 1990) condemns aggressive acts
perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait,
including the abduction of foreign nationals, and demands their immediate
release.
• Security Council Resolution 670 (Sept. 25, 1990) condemns Iraq for its
continued violation of Resolutions 660, 662, 664 and 667 and the treatment of
Kuwaiti nationals by Iraqi forces, and enhances economic sanctions imposed by
Resolution 661.
• Security Council Resolution 674 (Oct. 29, 1990) demands Iraq cease and desist
from taking third-State nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing
Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and comply with its obligations under various
international agreements regarding third-State nationals and diplomatic and
consular missions.
• Security Council Resolution 677 (Nov. 28, 1990) condemns attempts by Iraq to
alter the demographic composition of Kuwait and to destroy civil records
maintained by the government.
• Security Council Resolution 678 (Nov. 29, 1990) affords Iraq one last
opportunity to comply fully with Security Council Resolution 660 and all
subsequent relevant resolutions, and authorizes member States to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.
• Security Council Resolution 687 (Apr. 3, 1991) suspends Resolution 678 by
declaring a formal ceasefire between Iraq and Kuwait and the member States
cooperating with Kuwait; decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of
all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and related
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subsystems and components and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers and related major parts and repair and production facilities; decides
that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons
or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components of any
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities; and requires Iraq to
inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of
international terrorism or allow any terrorist organization to operate within its
territory.
• Security Council Resolution 688 (Apr. 5, 1991) condemns, and demands that
Iraq end, the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, including the Kurds.
• Security Council Resolution 707 (Aug. 15, 1991) affirms Iraq is in material
breach of Resolution 687; condemns Iraq for failing to comply with the terms of
the ceasefire agreement and cooperate with the UN Special Commission and
IAEA inspectors; and requires Iraq to comply fully and without delay with all its
obligations, including Resolution 687.
• Security Council Resolution 715 (Oct. 11, 1991) demands that Iraq meet
unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved in the resolution and
cooperate fully with the UN Special Commission and the IAEA.
• Security Council Resolution 949 (Oct. 15, 1994) condemns Iraq’s military
deployment in the direction of the border with Kuwait, and demands the
immediate withdrawal of all forces and that Iraq not take any other action to
enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq.
• Security Council Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) deplores the refusal by Iraq
to allow access to sites designated by the UN Special Commission and in violation
of Resolutions 687, 707 and 715, and demands Iraq cooperate fully with the UN
Special Commission and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional and
unrestricted access to anything they wish to inspect.
• Security Council Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) condemns the repeated
refusal of Iraq to allow access to sites designated by the UN Special Commission,
in violation of Resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1060, and demands that Iraq
cooperate fully with the UN Special Commission and allow inspection teams
immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to anything they wish to
inspect.
• Security Council Resolution 1134 (Oct. 23, 1997) condemns the repeated
refusal of Iraq to allow access to sites designated by the UN Special Commission,
actions by Iraq endangering the safety, and interfering with the freedom of
movement, of UN Special Commission personnel and the removal and
destruction of documents of interest to the UN Special Commission; decides Iraq
is in flagrant violation of Resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1060; and demands that
Iraq fully cooperate with the UN Special Commission and allow the inspection
teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to anything they wish to
inspect and personnel they wish to interview.
• Statement by the President of the Security Council (Oct. 29, 1997) condemns
the October 29 decision of Iraq to try to dictate the terms of its compliance with
its obligations to cooperate with the UN Special Commission, demands that Iraq
cooperate fully without conditions or restrictions with the UN Special
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Commission, and reminds Iraq of its responsibility for the safety and security of
the personnel of the UN Special Commission.
• Security Council Resolution 1137 (Nov. 12, 1997) determines that the
situation continues to constitute a threat to international peace and stability;
condemns the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations to cooperate fully
and unconditionally with the UN Special Commission, including Iraq’s October
29 decision to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with the UN Special
Commission, its refusal on October 30 and November 2 to allow entry to two
officials of the UN Special Commission, its denial of entry to inspectors on
November 3–7 to sites designated by the UN Special Commission for inspection,
its implicit threat to the safety of surveillance aircraft operating on behalf of the
UN Special Commission, its removal of significant pieces of dual-use equipment
from their previous sites, and its tampering with monitoring cameras of the UN
Special Commission; demands that Iraq rescind immediately its October 29
decision; demands that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately and without
condition or restrictions with the UN Special Commission; imposes travel
restrictions on Iraqi officials responsible for these violations; and reaffirms Iraq’s
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of the personnel and equipment of
the UN Special Commission.
• Statement of the President of the Security Council (Nov. 13, 1997) condemns
the unacceptable decision of Iraq to expel personnel of the UN Special
Commission, demands the immediate and unequivocal revocation of this action
and demands that Iraq comply immediately and fully with its obligations under
the relevant resolutions.
• Statement of the President of the Security Council (Jan. 14, 1998) deplores
Iraq’s statement of January 12 and its subsequent failure to fulfill its obligations to
provide the UN Special Commission full, unconditional and immediate access to
all sites, which is a clear violation of relevant resolutions, and reiterates the
demand that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately and without conditions or
restrictions with the UN Special Commission.
• Security Council Resolution 1154 (Mar. 2, 1998) endorses the February 23,
1998 memorandum of understanding between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
and the Secretary-General and looks forward to its early and full implementation.
• Security Council Resolution 1194 (Sept. 9, 1998) condemns the decision of
Iraq of August 5, 1998 to suspend cooperation with the UN Special Commission
and the IAEA, which constitutes a totally unacceptable contravention of its
obligations under Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115 and 1154 and the
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
and the Secretary-General on February 23, 1998.
• Security Council Resolution 1205 (Nov. 5, 1998) condemns the decision by
Iraq of October 31, 1998 to cease cooperation with the UN Special Commission
as a flagrant violation of Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions; demands
that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of October 31, as
well as the decision of August 5, 1998, to suspend cooperation with the UN
Special Commission and to maintain restrictions on the work of the IAEA; and
demands that Iraq provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation
with the UN Special Commission and the IAEA.
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• Security Council Resolution 1284 (Dec. 17, 1999) recalls that Iraq has not yet
complied with its obligations under Resolutions 686 and 687 to return all Kuwaiti
and third-country nationals present in Iraq and to return all Kuwaiti property it
had seized, and established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the UN Special Commission.
• Security Council Resolution 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) deplores that Iraq failed to
cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA; deplores that Iraq failed to comply
with its commitments in Resolution 687 with regard to terrorism, Resolution 688
to end repression of its civilian population, and Resolutions 686, 687 and 1284 to
account for Kuwaiti and third-country nationals; decides that Iraq remains in
material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions through its failure to
cooperate with UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and to complete actions required
by Resolution 687; decides to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions; decides that
Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council within thirty
days a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its WMD
and ballistic missile programs; decides that false statements or omissions in the
declarations submitted by Iraq and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and
cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute a further
material breach of Iraq’s obligations; decides that Iraq will provide UNMOVIC
and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to
anything they wish to inspect or any persons they wish to interview; directs
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference
with inspection activities or Iraq’s failure to comply with its disarmament
obligations; and decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report of
noncompliance in order to consider the situation.
13. E.g., U.N. Charter; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 301 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) (treatment of Kuwaiti nationals by
Iraqi forces during its occupation in 1990) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (Iraqi acts
against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait); Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (Iraqi acts against diplomatic and consular
missions in Kuwait); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S.
8061, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 158 (Iraq made statements
threatening to use chemical and biological weapons and used chemical weapons on prior occa-
sions); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 (Iraq made attempts to acquire materials for a nuclear weapons program).
14. S.C. Res. 707, U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (Aug. 15, 1991).
15. Joint Resolution, Iraq Compliance with International Obligations, Pub. L. No. 105-235,
112 Stat. 1538 (1998); Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178 (1998);
Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 4. Examples of Iraq’s continuing material
breach of its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions include:
• August 1991—Iraq failed to comply with the terms of the ceasefire agreement
and cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.
• January/February 1992—Iraq rejected plans to install long-term monitoring
equipment and cameras called for in Security Council resolutions.
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• February 1992—Iraq continued to obstruct the installation of monitoring
equipment and failed to comply with UNSCOM orders to allow destruction of
missiles and other proscribed weapons.
• July 1992—Iraq denied UNSCOM inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of
Agriculture.
• December 1992—Iraq violated the southern no-fly zone, raided a weapons
depot in Kuwait and denied landing rights to a plane carrying UN weapons
inspectors.
• April 1993—Iraq orchestrated a failed plot to assassinate former President
George Bush during his visit to Kuwait.
• June 1993—Iraq prevented UNSCOM’s installation of cameras and
monitoring equipment.
• October 1994—Iraq threatened to end cooperation with weapons inspectors if
sanctions were not ended and massed ten thousand troops along the border with
Kuwait.
• April 1995—UNSCOM reported that Iraq had concealed its biological
weapons program and had failed to account for seventeen tons of biological
weapons material.
• April 1995—Iraq continued repression of its civilian population, including the
Kurds.
• July 1995—Iraq threatened to end cooperation with UNSCOM.
• March 1996—Iraq barred UNSCOM inspectors from sites containing
documents and weapons on four separate days.
• June 1996—Iraq repeatedly barred UNSCOM inspectors from military sites.
• August 1996—Iraqi troops overran Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.
• December 1996—Iraq prevented UNSCOM from removing 130 Scud missile
engines from Iraq for analysis.
• April 1997—Iraq violated the southern no-fly zone.
• June 1997—Iraqi officials on board UNSCOM aircraft interfered with the
controls and inspections, endangering inspectors and obstructing the UNSCOM
mission.
• September 1997—an Iraqi official attacked UNSCOM officials engaged in
photographing illegal Iraqi activities.
• October 1997—Iraq announced that it would no longer allow US inspectors
working with UNSCOM to conduct inspections in Iraq, blocked UNSCOM
teams containing US inspectors from conducting inspections and threatened to
shoot down US U-2 surveillance flights in support of UNSCOM.
• November 1997—Iraq expelled US inspectors from Iraq, leading to
UNSCOM’s decision to pull out its remaining inspectors.
• January 1998—an UNSCOM team led by an American was barred from
conducting inspections.
• June 1998—the UNSCOM director presented information to the Security
Council indicating clearly that Iraq, in direct contradiction to information
provided to UNSCOM, had a weaponized nerve agent.
• August 1998—Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and threatened to
end long-term monitoring activities by the IAEA and UNSCOM.
• October 1998—UN weapons inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq.
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• December 1998—Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA
inspectors, and did not agree to allow inspectors to return until 2002.
• November 2002—Iraq failed to provide complete disclosure of its WMD
programs and to cooperate fully with weapons inspectors.
16. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11.
17. Id.
18. UNMOVIC was the successor organization to UNSCOM and was established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999).
19. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11, Annex.
20. Id.
21. Id., operative para. 2.
22. Letter and enclosure from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af-
fairs to Donald Anderson MP, Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee: Iraq: Legal Position Con-
cerning the Use of Force (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/
20080205132101/fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Iraq%20-%20use%20of%20force.pdf [hereinafter Sec-
retary of State letter].
23. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11, operative paras. 1 & 2.
24. The US ambassador to the United Nations indicated that
if there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a
Member State, the matter will return to the council for discussion. . . . But if the Security
Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does
not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by
Iraq or to enforce the relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and
security.
WorldPress.org, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, http://www
.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
25. The UK government was of the opinion that, although a second resolution would have
been desirable, it was not a legal prerequisite (“all that was required was reporting to and discus-
sion by the Security Council of Iraq’s failures, but not an express further decision to authorize
force”). Iraq Military Action, supra note 4.
26. The French ambassador indicated that “a two-stage approach would ensure that the Se-
curity Council would maintain control of the process at each stage.” The Russian representative
“made clear that the resolution just adopted contains no provisions for the automatic use of
force. . . .” The Chinese delegate agreed with the French, indicating that “China supports the two-
stage approach.” The Irish delegate stated that “it is for the Council to decide on any ensuring ac-
tion.” The Mexican ambassador agreed, saying “that the use of force is valid only . . . with prior
explicit authorization required from the Security Council.” The Bulgarian delegate said that the
“resolution is not a pretext for automatic recourse to the use of force.” The Colombian represen-
tative agreed, indicating that the “resolution is not . . . a resolution to authorize the use of force.”
The Cameroonian ambassador stated that the “resolution does not contain traps or
automaticity.” The Syrian ambassador said that “the resolution should not be interpreted . . . as
authorizing any State to use force . . . [and that] it reaffirms the central role of the Security Coun-
cil.” The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, supra note 24.
27. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5, para. 7.
28. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11, para. 12.
29. According to the Attorney General:
The previous practice of the Council and statements made by Council members
during the negotiation of resolution 1441 demonstrate that the phrase “material
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breach” signifies a finding by the Council of a sufficiently serious breach of the cease-
fire conditions to revive the authorisation in resolution 678 and that “serious
consequences” is accepted as indicating the use of force.
Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5, para. 10.
30. Id., para. 12.
31. Secretary of State letter, supra note 22, para. 12.
32. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5, para. 13.
33. Id., para. 15.
34. S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
35. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5, para. 20.
36. Id., para. 22.
37. S.C. Res. 1137, para. 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137 (Nov. 12, 1997).
38. If the United States and Great Britain made any diplomatic mistakes in the months lead-
ing up to the invasion, it was in introducing a draft resolution with Spain in February 2003 that
proposed realizable “tests and a timetable for completion of those tests.” The draft also “sought
an understanding that, if Iraq failed those tests, it would not have taken the final opportunity”
that had been afforded to it under Resolution 1441. The Security Council was unable, however,
to reach consensus on the draft resolution, so it was tabled on February 24, 2003, with the United
States, the United Kingdom and Spain reserving “the right to take their own steps to secure the
disarmament of Iraq.” Iraq Military Action, supra note 4.
In my opinion, these efforts weakened the US and UK position and bolstered the opposition’s
argument that a second resolution was necessary to authorize the use of force against Iraq for its
failure to comply with Resolution 1441. The US and UK efforts beg the question: if they really felt
that they had sufficient legal authority to conduct military operations against Iraq under 1441,
why did they seek a second resolution?
39. Press Release SC/6611, UN Security Council, Security Council Meets to Discuss Military
Strikes Against Iraq; Some Members Challenge Use of Force without Council Consent (Dec. 16,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981216.sc6611.html.
40. The US representative stated that US and British forces “were acting under the authority
provided by Council resolutions” and that the airstrikes were “undertaken only when it was evi-
dent that diplomacy had been exhausted.” He further indicated that Iraq was aware of the Coun-
cil’s conditions requiring “full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of Iraq’s programmes
to develop weapons of mass destruction,” but that Iraq was repeatedly in flagrant material breach
of Council resolutions. Specifically, “by refusing to make available documents and information
requested by UNSCOM . . ., by imposing new restrictions on the weapons inspectors and by re-
peatedly denying access to facilities which UNSCOM wished to inspect, Iraq had acted in flagrant
material breach of resolution 687 (1991).” Id.
The UK representative indicated that Resolution 687 “had made it a condition of ceasefire
both that Iraq destroy its weapons of mass destruction and agree to the monitoring of its
obligation to destroy such weapons.” He further reiterated that Iraq had never cooperated with
UNSCOM and had “concealed evidence, blocked inspections and failed to produce documents
relevant to its programmes of mass destruction weapons which were known to exist.” Id.
41. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5.
42. The Portuguese representative supported the US and the UK position, arguing that the
United States and the United Kingdom had made it clear in November that “in the absence of full
cooperation by Iraq, they would act without returning to the Council.” He also emphasized that
the “main cause of the current crisis was the obstinate policy of Iraq’s rulers in refusing to comply
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with Council resolutions,” highlighting that the latest UNSCOM report stated that Iraq had “not
lived up to its commitments.” Press Release SC/6611, supra note 39.
43. The Japanese representative also supported the use of force by the United States and the
United Kingdom, emphasizing that “Iraq had failed to provide its full cooperation to
UNSCOM” and that had led to the airstrikes. He also strongly urged Iraq “to comply immedi-
ately and unconditionally with all its obligations under Council resolutions.” Id.
44. The Russian representative, on the other hand, argued that the airstrikes “violated the
principles of international law and the principle of the Charter,” arguing that “no one could act
independently on behalf of the United Nations . . . .” The Chinese representative agreed, indicating
that the airstrikes were “completely groundless,” and the French representative “deplored the situ-
ation that had led to the airstrike.” Costa Rica supported the Russian Federation’s position indicat-
ing that the use of force “was the sole and exclusive faculty of the Council . . . [and that] only the
United Nations could authorize such actions.” The Brazilian representative agreed, emphasizing
that “the Council remained the sole body with legal authority to mandate actions aimed at rein-
forcing compliance with its own resolutions.” Kenya also supported the Russian position, indi-
cating that “Kenya had repeatedly said any decision to take further action against Iraq remained
the sole responsibility of the Security Council.” The Swedish representative, while recognizing
that “Iraq had again and again refused to abide by the clear obligations decided by a unanimous
Security Council, and it was clear Iraq had not fulfilled the promise given to the Secretary-General
only a month ago that it would cooperate fully and without conditions with United Nations
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